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Abstract 
 
The ways in which preferences respond to the varying stress of economic environments is a 
key question for behavioral economics and public policy. We conducted a laboratory 
experiment to investigate the effects of stress on financial decision making among individuals 
aged 50 and older. Using the cold pressor task as a physiological stressor, and a series of 
intelligence tests as cognitive stressors, we find that stress increases subjective discounting 
rates, has no effect on the degree of risk-aversion, and substantially lowers the effort 
individuals make to learn about financial decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
The assumption of stable preferences is crucial to the definition of rationality in traditional 
economic models. However, a large recent literature points to non-stationarity of preferences in 
several empirical settings (e.g. Camerer 2004). Understanding the extent and biological basis of 
such instability is a key task that benefits from a better understanding of the role of biological 
stress processes in generating fluctuations in preferences, valuation and choices. Many 
important economic outcomes are generated by choices made often in stressful and unfamiliar 
environments and it is questionable whether the preferences held by individuals when 
construing tradeoffs in these environments are identical to preferences held when thinking 
about such tradeoffs in the abstract. Examples include making life-changing decisions about 
debt in the environment of a financial institution, under perceived time pressure, and making 
decisions about job-offers in the context of welfare centers. Furthermore, many economic 
outcomes generate stress and it is possible that the stress generated by such outcomes yields 
decision-making patterns that are inconsistent with rational behaviour e.g. suboptimal debt 
resolution mechanisms and inefficient job search patterns (e.g. Krueger and Mueller 2010, 
2012).   
While a body of psychological literature exists examining the effect of stress on 
decision-making, this literature is still very incomplete in terms of application to important 
economic questions. In particular, we have very little understanding of how stress influences 
the types of preferences central to economic decision making and economic models. We also 
have almost no evidence at all of the economic significance of the effect of stress on 
preferences and whether these effects are substantial enough to merit a change in core models 
of economic decision-making and ultimately the design of major policy institutions such as 
welfare mechanisms and regulatory structures for financial marketing and bankruptcy 
resolution.  
Our study investigates the effects of acute stress on financial decision-making, where 
subjects were invited to participate in two independent laboratory sessions. During both 
sessions, subjects were asked to respond to two blocks of financial decision tasks. After the 
first block, which lasted approximately 25 minutes, respondents were randomly assigned to one 
of three groups: a control group, who did not receive any stressor, a cognitive stressor group, 
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and a physical stressor group. Respondents assigned to the cognitive stressor protocol were 
subjected to a series of IQ questions, designed to increase in difficulty such that all participants 
would fail the tasks eventually. Under the physical stressor protocol, subjects were asked to 
place both of their feet into ice-cold (4°C, 40°F) water, a “cold pressor test” which is widely 
used in the medical literature and generally induces substantial increases in blood pressure as 
well as other sympathetic nervous system indicators (Wirch et al, 2006, Richardson et al., 
2013). Appendix 1 illustrates the setup of the physical stressor. After being exposed to the 
stressor, individuals were asked to respond to a second set of financial questions similar to the 
questions asked prior to the stressor. We find that exposure to stress significantly increases the 
degree of discounting displayed by individuals, and leads to large reductions in the 
respondents’ willingness to learn about investment options before making their final decision. 
On average, we find that stress increases monthly discounting rates by about one third, and 
reduces the average effort made to learn about risky decisions by about 20 percent. We also 
find that stress increases the degree of risk aversion – the observed differences in risk aversion 
were however not statistically significant.  
This paper provides the first rigorous estimates of the effects of experimentally-induced 
stress on decision making in three formalized economic tasks: risk preference elicitation, time 
preference elicitation and search tasks. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines 
previous literature on the topic of unstable time preferences. Section 3 describes the data and 
experimental methods used in the paper. Section 4 provides the results. Section 5 discusses the 
findings and concludes with recommendations for future research.  
  
2. Literature and rationale for experiments  
2.1 Theoretical Background  
There is a long tradition in economics of assuming that preferences are consistent. 
However, several studies show that this is not the case and that preferences fluctuate depending 
on various situational factors. For example, the empirical validity of the assumption that time 
preferences are well-approximated by exponential discounting functions which imply 
consistent preferences has been questioned (e.g. Samuelson 1937; see Frederick et al 2002 for 
review).   
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Furthermore, there have been intensive efforts to establish the extent and nature of 
individual differences in economic preferences. Most of this literature has focused on cognitive 
factors such as IQ and numeracy, executive functions such as working memory, and non-
cognitive traits such as impulsivity and sensitivity to reward (Shamosh et al., 2008; Shamosh & 
Gray, 2008; Reynolds et al., 2006). While this literature generally assumes that the traits 
driving individuals’ behavior are predetermined, evidence from lab-based experiments suggests 
that mood and emotional state can strongly affect individual decisions in the short run (see, 
e.g., Knapp and Clark, 1991).   
One strand of this new literature, summarized in Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 
(2007), measures discount rates using panel data on consumption, income, and savings over the 
lifecycle. More commonly, lab experiments have been used to elicit time preference with 
questions asking subjects to weigh immediate gains versus delayed rewards (reviewed in 
Ainslie, 1992 and Frederick, et al, 2002). A series of recent papers have also tried to link short-
term decision processes to differential limbic system activation of the brain (McClure et al, 
2004 & 2007). These studies find that short-term tradeoffs are generally processed in the 
emotion-focused subcortical limbic system, while long-term tradeoffs generally appear to be 
processed by the more cognitively orientated frontal-parietal system. While these studies have 
strengthened the links between individual decision processes and neuroscience, they fall short 
of explaining the large degree of heterogeneity observed across individuals when it comes to 
inter-temporal tradeoffs. A large literature has analyzed financial decision-making in laboratory 
settings in general, and the choices involved in trading immediate gains against delayed 
rewards in particular (reviewed in Ainslie, 1992 and Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 
2002). More importantly, the relative weighting of short- versus long-term benefits is critically 
affected by the physical and mental state of respondents, and strongly influenced by primary 
impulses such as hunger, thirst and sexual arousal.  
2.2 Stress and Economic Preferences  
 One central aspect of an individual's mental state, and the focus of this study, is short-
term stress.  Stress, which we shall define as state of strain or suspense, can be induced by a 
variety of physiological, social and cognitive factors. Physiologically, external stress factors 
trigger a state of alarm, generally associated with an increased production of adrenaline and 
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cortisol, higher blood pressure and increased heart beat frequency. Acknowledging the effect of 
stress on economic preferences can provide a better understanding of both inconsistent 
preferences and heterogeneity of preferences related to financial decision making. 
Previous research has shown the importance of stress in explaining financial decision 
making. Stress levels have been shown to predict both inconsistencies and heterogeneity in 
economically-relevant situations. A recent study investigated the effect of a cognitive stressor 
on decision making (Heereman & Walla, 2011). Two experiments were conducted; the 
probability of an outcome was unknown in one experiment and known in another. Self-
reported confidence in a decision was higher in stressed participants than controls when 
outcome probabilities were unknown. The opposite effect was found when outcome 
probabilities are known (stressed individuals reported lower confidence).  Stress levels were 
confirmed through skin conductance measures.  
Two studies have identified gender differences in financial decision-making when 
stressed. Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, and Bechara (2007) report that female participants 
anticipating giving a speech (stressed condition) performed better than controls on the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT). Men in the stress condition performed worse than controls. While this 
study did not have sufficient power to perform a reliable gender analysis, these results were 
replicated in a subsequent study. Van den Bos, Harteveld, and Stoop (2009) found a significant 
difference between males and females on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) after stress was 
induced (Trier Social Stress Test; TSST). In male subjects, higher cortisol levels were related 
to poorer performance on the gambling task. A slight increase in cortisol levels improved 
performance in female participants, while a higher increase reduced performance. More 
recently Haushofer et al (2013) find no effects of stress on inter-temporal choice. Using a 
sample of male undergraduates in the University of Zurich, they find that hormonal reactivity 
to a Trier Stress task does not predict changes in time discounting. In general, they do not find 
differences in discounting related to the stressor. 
Shamosh et al. (2008) investigated whether working memory might also determine 
delay-discounting ability but found no effect. Similarly, Porcelli and Delgado (2009) found that 
stress did not affect working memory performance. Porcelli and Delgado (2009) also describe 
the effect of acute stress on financial decision-making. They found a “reflection effect” under 
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stressful conditions whereby conservative choices are more likely to be reported when making 
decisions related to profit and risky decisions reported when making “loss” choices.  An 
observational study, which contributed ecological validity to the topic of stress and financial 
decision making, recorded cortisol and testosterone in male traders (Coates & Herbert, 2008). 
Morning testosterone level predicted the subject’s profitability that day, while cortisol levels 
rose with market volatility and variation in trading results. Reviews on the effect of stress on 
neurophysiology and the sympathetic nervous system have been published by Dickerson & 
Kemeny (2004); Nater & Rohleder (2009). 
In this study, we use a laboratory experiment to investigate how cognitive and 
physiological stressors affect decision-making. In contrast to most laboratory experiments 
which focus either on a mixed or a student population, our focus is on individuals aged 50 and 
over. The focus on individuals of this age group is important for two reasons: firstly, it can be 
presumed that individuals in this age group will exhibit far larger variation in terms of life-
styles and day-to-day exposure to stress. Second, relatively little evidence regarding the general 
decision patterns among this age group is available, though many of the most important 
lifetime financial decisions regarding long-term health insurance, retirement saving and final 
retirement decisions are made by individuals in this age bracket. Another important aspect of 
our study is the use of well-known economic preference questions that allow us to benchmark 
the quantitative importance of the stress effects being examined.  
The results of this project have implications both for economic theory and applied 
decision-making research. By integrating stress as a determinant of economic preferences, 
some intra-individual fluctuations and inter-individual heterogeneity of preferences, which are 
not consistent with traditional stress-free economic models, might be explained. Empirically, 
the research can contribute to a better understanding of many economic decisions made in 
arguably stressful situations.  
 
3. Sample Recruitment and Experiment Design 
3.1 Sample and Recruitment 
As this study was particularly concerned with decision-making among older people, only 
participants aged 50 and older were eligible for the study. While some subjects were recruited 
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from an existing subject pool maintained by the laboratory, few subjects over 50 were 
available, so that most recruitment was done through Craigslist (www.craiglist.com). Craigslist 
is an online ‘bulletin board’ of adverts. In terms of recruitment, this means that all subjects had 
subjects had to have access to the Internet and be able to reply to an ad by e-mail. Study 
participants were informed that the experiment would require them to answer questions on a 
computer. In order to exclude adverse reactions to stress, we excluded respondents with a 
history of heart attack or stroke, uncontrolled thyroid condition or thyroid surgery within the 
last 6 months, and respondents under treatment with anticoagulation medication. Given that 
one of the stressors involved being exposed to cold water we also excluded subjects with a 
known sensitivity of fingers or toes to exposure to cold diagnosed by a health professional (a 
syndrome known as Raynaud’s phenomenon).    
 Our sample recruitment, inclusion restrictions, and the need for a multi-visit 
participation in the experiment, were likely to lead to a more educated, less economically 
active, sample. To provide a better sense of these differences, we compare the sample 
population with the US census population (US Census Bureau, 2011).  Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics for study participants and a comparison sample from the same (over 50s) 
population.  The average study participant was 57 years old; the oldest study participant was 79 
at the time of the lab session, while the youngest just 50.  As the table shows, people from one-
person households were over-represented in the study - only 17% of participants were married 
compared to 63% in the overall population, and also a surprisingly large fraction (41.05%) of 
the participants were never married, in contrast to the 7.38% of the U.S. population that has 
never been married. Additionally, the participants tended to be more educated than the U.S. 
average from the equivalent age groups – a gap that is statistically significant.  For example, 
over 90% of study participants had some college or higher education, which is only true for 
51% of the overall population in that age group. In contrast, the labor participation rate among 
the study population was lower, and a higher percentage of the study population belongs to the 
lowest income bracket used in the census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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3.2 Design 
The laboratory experiment was conducted at the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory.1 The 
laboratory features thirty-six cubicles equipped with networked PCs. Twelve of the cubicles, 
exclusively used for our study, also feature physiological measurement equipment, which 
includes three modules: an impedance cardiograph, a four-channel bio amplifier, and a four-
channel transducer module.     
 Eligible individuals were briefed at the laboratory facilities, and upon giving their 
consent, enrolled in the study for three days.  On Day 1, individuals participated in a laboratory 
session, which lasted approximately one hour. The session was divided into two blocks of 
financial decisions, with a short-break in the middle, during which a randomly selected stressor 
was administered to the treatment groups as detailed below. Throughout the entire laboratory 
session, heart rates were monitored continuously through a Suunto heart rate belt worn around 
the chest. In addition, four measures of blood pressure, and two saliva-based cortisol measures 
were taken at various points throughout the laboratory study as two alternative measures of 
stress.  On the second day of the study, participants were asked to continuously wear the heart 
rate belt in order to obtain an estimate of study participants’ heart rate variability and range on 
a typical day. In addition, participants were asked to complete a short phone interview during 
which information about location and activities were collected. On Day 3, participants were 
asked to return to the laboratory for a second experimental session identical in structure (except 
for the stressor) to the session on Day 1.   
 During each laboratory session, study participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three stressor groups: no stressor (control), cognitive stressor, and physical stressor. The 
cognitive stressor was made up of a series of IQ test questions designed to make people fail. 
Subjects were exposed to three principal tasks: A color STROOP test (Jensen & Rohwer, 
1966), the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT) (Gronwall 1977) and a series of 
forward and backward digit span tests (Humstone (1919), Schroeder et al., 2012). In the 
cognitive stressor session, each task completed correctly was followed by a more challenging 
task, and once three tasks within a given task were failed, individuals moved on to the next 
task.  
                                                 
1 See decisionlab.harvard.edu for details on facilities. 
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 In order to generate physical stress, study participants were asked to immerse both feet into a 
foot bath filled with ice-cold (4° Celsius, 40° Fahrenheit) water. This “cold-pressor” test is a 
cardiovascular test commonly performed to test vascular response and pulse excitability; the 
response to the cold water immersion triggers a physiological response, leading to a 
statistically significant increase in both heart rate and blood pressure as described in further 
detail below.2  In total, 97 participants were enrolled in the study, with 93% (90) successfully 
completing both laboratory sessions, for a total of 187 sessions. Table 2 outlines the key 
descriptive statistics for the study population (See Appendix 1 for Cold Stressor Task Pictures). 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
3.3 Measures   
The core objective of the study is to understand the effects of stress on decision making.  We 
assess three commonly used measures of decision making: implicit discount rates, the degree 
of risk aversion, and willingness to invest in acquiring relevant information before making 
financial decisions. 
Time Discounting 
To measure time discounting, the study incorporated a set of inter-temporal choice questions 
developed by Kirby and Marakovic (1996).  Each question prompts respondents to make a 
decision between a financial payoff “today” and a larger future payoff. The questions vary both 
the current payoff, the future payoff, and the time period the respondent has to wait to receive 
the future reward. In order to ensure truthful reporting to all financial trade-off questions, one 
choice question was randomly selected for payout at the end of the section, and subjects paid 
based on their decisions. 
As outlined in Table 3, a total of 21 discounting questions were asked to subjects in each 
session – 11 prior to the stressor, and 10 after the stressor. The questions are relatively 
                                                 
2 The cold pressor task is a widely used method for inducing laboratory discomfort and stress without placing the 
respondent at risk.  Birnie and colleagues (2011) examined self-reports of the cold pressor task given by children. 
They distributed surveys to children (and their parents) who had participated in cold pressor tasks. All children 
indicated they were happy they had participated (n=175), and while 33% of children identified the cold pressor 
task as the least enjoyable aspect of the research, average overall experience was rated highly (mean 8.37/10).  
99% of parents said they would take part in a research study in the future and that they would recommend the 
experience to a friend (n=194). 
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straightforward, and simply ask people questions along the lines of “Would you rather have [.] 
dollars today, or [.] dollars in [.] days?” Implicit discounting rates varied widely, ranging 
between 1% (question 2) and 400% (question 8).  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Risk Aversion 
To measure risk aversion, the study presented each participant with a sequence of ten choices 
between two lotteries as proposed by Holt and Laury (2002). Each question confronts study 
participants with a choice between two lotteries. Both lotteries feature the same probabilities of 
the good and bad outcomes, respectively. The main difference is that one lottery comes with a 
significantly larger spread, i.e. a significantly larger difference between the good and the bad 
outcome; these differences in risk are paired with differences in net payouts, which can be 
positive or negative. The Holt and Laury questions are designed to allow both for risk-averse 
and risk-loving preferences. For example, in question number eight in Table 4, respondents are 
given the choice between one lottery paying US $20 with 90 percent probability, and paying 
US $30 with 10 percent probability, and another lottery paying US$ 10 with 90 percent 
probability, and US $50 with 10 percent probability. To any risk-neutral or risk averse 
individual, this choice is easy, since the risky lottery promised US $7 more in expected terms; 
only respondents with preferences for risk will choose option B in this case. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 In order to estimate the level risk aversion displayed by study participants, we ranked 
choice sets with respect to the expected payouts in compensation for the additional risk 
undertaken in Table 5. As expected, the fraction of individuals choosing the more risky option 
increases with the magnitude of the reward for taking the risk. Quite remarkably, even with a 
marginally negative reward (lower expected payoff with higher risk – question 4) 20% of 
individuals choose the more risky version; the fraction declines to 8% once the expected value 
difference becomes larger.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Willingness to Learn 
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To measure willingness to learn, we implemented a slightly modified version of the 
“experience-sampling” task developed by Erev et al (2010) and Hertwig et al (2004). In this 
game, individuals have to make a choice between a save payout and a lottery. Rather than 
telling participants the payouts and respective probabilities, participants face uncertainty about 
the actual risk, and are given a chance to learn about the investment option. The learning is 
done during the "sampling stage", which precedes the final decision. During the sampling 
stage, individuals can experiment with the investment option: every time they press a button, 
they get to see a random draw from the lottery at hand. No time limit was given to this learning 
session, so that the number of random draws “experienced” by each participant could be 
anywhere between zero and infinity. As Table 6 illustrates, both the probabilities and payouts 
varied substantially across questions, so that a rather substantial number of clicks was needed 
to get a clear sense regarding the lottery’s payout structure.  
[TABLE 6 HERE]  
Willingness to learn exhibited a truncated normal distribution when evaluated by the maximum 
number of clicks. Ranging from 0 to 63 clicks, the distribution of the maximum number of 
clicks peaked at 1 click as a significant fraction of the participants made a decision after 
clicking once to learn about a random outcome of the lottery. However, more than ten percent 
of the participants used at least 20 clicks to learn about the content of the lottery.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Stressors and Blood Pressure Response 
The first question to address is whether the two stressors led to an increase in physical stress. 
To measure the physiological response to the stressors, supervisors took subjects’ blood 
pressure at four time points: the very beginning of the study (BP1), once the first block of 
questions was answered and participants had settled in (BP2), directly after the stressor (BP3), 
and at the very end of the study (BP4). The rationale for taking two blood pressure measures at 
the beginning of the study was to see whether the initial setup of the study (familiarization with 
computer program and hooking up of physiological devices – similar to “white coat stress”) 
was stressful in itself; as Figure 1 illustrates, this was indeed the case, with the systolic blood 
pressure showing a rather remarkable decline from an average value around 135 to an average 
of 125 within the first 15 minutes of the laboratory session. While both the systolic and the 
diastolic blood pressure measures stayed more or less constant at the levels observed once 
settled it (measure 2), subjects exposed to the cold pressure test experienced a steep increase in 
blood pressure. Average levels of diastolic blood pressure increased from a level around 77 to a 
level around 81, and average systolic blood pressures increased by about 10 points from 124 to 
135 millimeters of mercury (mmHg).    
Figure 1: Laboratory Stressors and Blood Pressure 
  
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
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 Table 7 presents regression results of the stressors on both blood pressure measures and 
shows a significant effect. 
4.2 Effects on Decision Making 
We analyze three outcome variables: the discounting rate displayed in the discounting tasks, 
the rate of risk aversion displayed in the Holt and Laury (2002) tasks, and the number of 
random draws taken from the uncertain lottery in the experience sampling tasks.  
 Each study participant answered one block of each task before and after the stressor in 
each laboratory session. Therefore we have two decision blocks for each task and study session 
and four decision blocks for (most) study participants. All questions answered before and after 
the stressor were the same for both the Day 1 and the Day 3 sessions. Table 8 shows the 
average response rates by question and block. While there is significant variation within each 
block for the time-discounting and the risk aversion tasks, the average number of samples 
drawn for the uncertain lotteries appears to be more or less constant across questions and days, 
with an average of approximately 6 draws. Given that respondents faced the same set of 
questions on day 1 and day 3 of the experiment, one interesting question was whether 
individuals would show evidence of learning, i.e. become better at answering these questions. 
A simple comparison of the Day 1 and Day 3 columns for the discounting and risk aversion 
task suggests that this was indeed the case, with individuals on average becoming more patient, 
but also more risk averse over time; furthermore, the average number of draws from the lottery 
appears to decline rather than to increase between day 1 and day 3. 
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 [TABLE 8 HERE] 
 To investigate the effects of stress on decision-making, we estimate the following 
model 
(1) 1 2 ,it t i itY PS CSα β β δ δ ε= + + + + +   
where is the decision parameter of interest for individual i  in block ,t  PS  is an indicator for 
whether the person was under physical stress when taking the decisions, CS  an indicator for 
whether the person was under cognitive stress when taking the decision, and ,t iδ ∂  are block 
and individual fixed effects. The inclusion of individual fixed effects implies that estimates 
exclusively explore the within-subject variations in decision patterns under various stress 
conditions; temporal fixed effects are included to control for general learning or exhaustion 
effects between the various sessions. 
[TABLE 9 HERE]  
 Table 9 shows the main results on our experimental treatment. Column 1 of Table 9 
shows the result for the discounting rates computed based on the decision patterns in the time 
discounting tasks. Average discounting rates in the non-stressed conditions were 90% - both 
the cognitive and the cold stressor - appear to increase this rate by about 30 percentage points, 
with slightly larger effects for the cognitive stressor. Column (2) shows the results for the risk 
aversion parameter computed based on the risky lottery tasks. The average risk aversion 
parameter (rho) among non-stressed subjects was 0.34 with a large standard deviation of 1.2. 
The results in Table 9 suggest that both stressors increase risk aversion, but both effects are 
small (0.1 in absolute magnitude corresponds to about 0.25 SDs), and not statistically 
significant. Column (3) shows the results for the experience sampling task. The dependent 
variable in this regression is the natural log of the number of clicks, so that the estimated 
coefficients reflect percentage changes. The results presented suggest that both stressors reduce 
the willingness to learn by about 20 percent, with slightly large (but not statistically different) 
point estimates for the cold stressor. Results look similar when the absolute number of clicks is 
taken as dependent variable (not shown); the estimated 20 percent reduction corresponds to a 
reduction from an average of 6 clicks pre-stressor to 4.5 clicks under stress.  
[TABLE 10 HERE]  
y
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Table 10 displays the predictive effect of individual differences on choices across the three 
tasks. As found in Daly et al (2009) higher blood pressure predicts higher discount rates. 
Furthermore, higher cortisol rates predict higher discount rates. However, higher cortisol rates 
also predict higher levels of exploratory behaviour in the experience sampling task. Neither 
cortisol nor blood pressure predicts risk preferences.  
 
5. Discussion 
This paper demonstrates strong effects of an experimentally induced stressor on both time 
preferences and willingness to learn. Our effects are both statistically significant and sizable in 
magnitude. When exposed to a randomly assigned minor stressor, experimental respondents 
exhibit more present-focused preferences and also are less likely to explore available options. 
We do not find an effect of either cognitive or physiological stress on risk attitudes. Our results 
are strengthened by the use of well-known economic preference tasks that have been examined 
in an extensive literature, as well as well-tested psychological stress paradigms.  
These results are important in providing empirical evidence and a plausible biological 
basis for preference reversals in key areas of economic decision-making. They are also 
potentially important for policy. Many real-world financial decisions arguably involve stress at 
the point of decision and our results clearly suggest that this may lead to fewer exploratory and 
less future-oriented decisions with clearly negative potential for individual and societal 
welfare. For example, stress-induced increases in discounting or declines in willingness to 
search could potentially lead to lower levels of job search leading to either prolonged 
unemployment or increased likelihood of accepting lower-quality positions. Recent work by 
Mani et al. (2013) suggests that poverty can impede cognitive function and the quality of 
decisions – the results presented in this study suggest that physical or cognitive stress could 
play an important role in this relationship. 
Our results are limited to the extent that the tasks used are stylized experimental 
elicitations of preferences. Our results on discounting are at odds with those of Haushofer et al 
who do not find any effect of experimentally induced stress on time discounting. The use of 
different age samples is one potential explanation of the differences and future research on the 
life-cycle of stress reactivity on preferences would be very informative in this regard. While 
such tasks offer the advantage of providing data that can be quantified in meaningful economic 
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magnitudes, the extent to which they are analogous to real-world financial decisions is a matter 
of debate. Furthermore, the extent to which experimentally induced stressors mimic the 
qualitative nature of stress experienced during real-world financial decisions is a question for 
future research.   
The development of naturalistic designs to examine the role of stress in important real-
world financial decisions is an important area for future research. The endogeneity of timing of 
stressful decisions is a clear barrier to the development of such studies and field trials that can 
account for this will provide an important mechanism for testing the connection between the 
effects of experimental and real-world stress.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics – Study vs. US Population > 50 years of Age 
 Study Population U.S. Population 
Gender   
Male 0.573 0.464 
Female 0.427 0.536 
Race   
African-American 0.089 0.100 
Asian-American 0.089 0.039 
White/Caucasian 0.822 0.844 
Marital Status   
Never married 0.411 0.074 
Married 0.173 0.630 
Divorced or separated 0.357 0.157 
Widowed 0.060 0.140 
Household size   
One person 0.595 0.376 
Two people 0.227 0.456 
Three people 0.114 0.097 
Four people 0.022 0.041 
Five or more people 0.032 0.030 
Highest level of education  
Some high school 0.011 0.144 
High school diploma or equivalent 0.043 0.337 
Some college 0.265 0.244 
College diploma 0.357 0.164 
Graduate degree 0.324 0.110 
Employment status   
% working 0.395 0.457 
Income   
Income: $0-$20,000 0.357 0.099 
Income: $20,001 - $75,000 0.395 0.671 
Income: $75,001 - $100,000 0.141 0.096 
Income: $100,001 or more 0.065 0.134 
 
SOURCE:   Author calculations based on US Census Bureau 2010 statistics. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics – Study Population 
 
 Control Cold Pressor Cognitive Stressor F-stat 
 (N=23) (N=80) (N=84)  
Variable Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. (pvalue) 
Year of birth 1949 9.04 1953 5.85 1953 6.08 0.0232 
Female 0.48 0.51 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.8629 
High school or less 0.17 0.39 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.0246 
College 0.26 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.0244 
Grad school 0.57 0.51 0.41 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.3198 
Single 0.43 0.51 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.50 0.9561 
Married 0.17 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.39 0.9633 
Separated 0.26 0.45 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.5279 
Widowed 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.2997 
Household size 1.52 0.73 1.71 1.10 1.72 1.09 0.7129 
Number of children 1.65 1.72 1.38 1.65 1.30 1.65 0.6742 
Working 0.39 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.6764 
Unemployed  0.22 0.42 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.1814 
Retired 0.39 0.50 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.0687 
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Table 3 
Time Discounting Choices 
 
Round I 
Question Option A  Option B Monthly interest rate 
1 $17  tonight  $42  in 43 days 102.6% 
2 $42  tonight  $43  in 35 days 1.0% 
3 $24  tonight  $28  in 45 days 9.7% 
4 $11  tonight  $15  in 75 days 17.1% 
5 $15  tonight  $18  in 20 days 25.0% 
6 $34  tonight  $43  in 35 days 23.0% 
7 $13  tonight  $18  in 25 days 48.0% 
8 $23  tonight  $35  in 35 days 47.6% 
9 $16  tonight  $28  in 20 days 107.8% 
10 $8  tonight  $18  in 10 days 400.0% 
11 $15  tonight  $43  in 14 days 392.9% 
         
Round II 
Question Option A  Option B Monthly interest rate 
1 $27  tonight  $28  in 55 days 2% 
2 $14  tonight  $15  in 35 days 10% 
3 $33  tonight  $38  in 50 days 9% 
4 $24  tonight  $30  in 50 days 17% 
5 $20  tonight  $33  in 70 days 27% 
6 $25  tonight  $40  in 70 days 26% 
7 $20  tonight  $28  in 25 days 45% 
8 $8  tonight  $15  in 35 days 75% 
9 $20  tonight  $35  in 20 days 113% 
10 $12  tonight  $28  in 10 days 388% 
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Table 4: Risky Lottery Question Sequence 
Round I 
   Lottery A  Lottery B       
Order Prob 1 Prob 2 Payout 1 Payout 2  Payout 1 Payout 2  Δ E Δ var 
Δ E / 
Δ var rho Type 
1 90% 10% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  -1.8 8 -0.21 -1.54 RL 
2 60% 40% 20 30  10 50  2.0 360 0.01 0.30  
3 10% 90% 20 30  10 50  17.0 135 0.13 2.85  
4 70% 30% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  -0.3 20 -0.01 -0.15 RL 
5 30% 70% 20 30  10 50  11.0 315 0.03 1.54  
6 10% 90% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  4.3 8 0.50 2.85  
7 30% 70% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  2.8 20 0.14 1.54  
8 90% 10% 20 30  10 50  -7.0 135 -0.05 -1.54 RL 
9 70% 30% 20 30  10 50  -1.0 315 0.00 -0.15 RL 
10 60% 40% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  0.5 23 0.02 0.30  
              
Round II 
   Lottery A  Lottery B       
Order Prob 1 Prob 2 Payout 1 Payout 2  Payout 1 Payout 2  Δ E Δ var 
Δ E/Δ 
var rho Cat 
1 70% 30% 20 30  10 50  -1.0 315 0.00 -0.15 RL 
2 30% 70% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  2.8 20 0.14 1.54  
3 60% 40% 20 30  10 50  2.0 360 0.01 0.30  
4 70% 30% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  -0.3 20 -0.01 -0.15 RL 
5 30% 70% 20 30  10 50  11.0 315 0.03 1.54  
6 90% 10% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  -1.8 8 -0.21 -1.54 RL 
7 10% 90% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  4.3 8 0.50 2.85  
8 60% 40% 5 7.5  2.5 12.5  0.5 23 0.02 0.30  
9 10% 90% 20 30  10 50  17.0 135 0.13 2.85  
10 90% 10% 20 30  10 50  -7.0 135 -0.05 -1.54 RL 
Notes: RL stands for risk-loving preferences; rho is the CRRA rate to make a rational agent indifferent. 
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Table 5 
Risky Lottery Choices Ranked by Differences in Expected Value & Actual Decisions 
 
Question Option A   Option B Δ E 
Fraction 
Choosing 
A 
3 90% of $20 and 10% of $30     90% of $10 and 10% of $50 17 0.808 
5 90% of $5 and 10% of $7.5     90% of $2.5 and 10% of $12.5 11 0.845 
6 70% of $20 and 30% of $30     70% of $10 and 30% of $50 4.3 0.738 
7 70% of $5 and 30% of $7.5     70% of $2.5 and 30% of $12.5 2.8 0.658 
2 60% of $5 and 40% of $7.5     60% of $2.5 and 40% of $12.5 2 0.578 
10 60% of$20 and 40% of $30     60% of $10 and 40% of $50 0.5 0.481 
4 30% of $5 and 70% of $7.5     30% of $2.5 and 70% of $12.5 -0.3 0.193 
9 10% of $5 and 90% of $7.5     10% of $2.5 and 90% of $12.5 -1 0.155 
1 30% of $20 and 70% of $30     30% of $10 and 70% of $50 -1.8 0.139 
8 10% of $20 and 90% of $30     10% of $10 and 90% of 50 -7 0.080 
 
 
26 
 
  
Table 6 
Experience Sampling – Willingness to Learn Task 
 
Round I Option A  Option B  Comparison 
Question Payout Prob  P1 P2 R1 R2  E(A) E(B) Δ E Cat 
1 5 100%  0.8 0.2 2.5 25  5 7.0 2.0  
2 20 100%  0.8 0.2 22.5 2.5  20 18.5 -1.5 RL 
3 5 100%  0.6 0.4 5 10  5 7.0 2.0 SDA 
4 20 100%  0.5 0.5 30 5  20 17.5 -2.5 RL 
5 5 100%  0.3 0.7 2.5 25  5 18.3 13.3  
6 20 100%  0.1 0.9 22.5 5  20 6.8 -13.3 RL 
             
Round II Option A  Option B  Comparison 
Question Payout Prob  P1 P2 R1 R2  E(A) E(B) Δ E Cat 
1 20 100%  0.5 0.5 30 5  20 17.5 -2.5 RL 
2 5 100%  0.3 0.7 2.5 25  5 18.3 13.3  
3 20 100%  0.1 0.9 22.5 5  20 6.8 -13.3 RL 
4 5 100%  0.6 0.4 5 10  5 7.0 2.0 SDA 
5 20 100%  0.8 0.2 22.5 2.5  20 18.5 -1.5 RL 
6 5 100%  0.8 0.2 2.5 25  5 7.0 2.0  
 
Notes:  RL stands for risk loving preferences. SDA marks choices where the safe option A is strategically 
dominated by B. 
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Table 7 
Effect of Experiment on Physiological Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Systolic blood pressure Diastolic blood 
pressure 
Cortisol 
    
Cold 10.83*** 1.872 -0.0410 
 (1.961) (1.429) (0.0325) 
Cognitive 1.755 -2.045 0.0590 
 (1.859) (1.343) (0.0503) 
Post -1.735 0.614 -0.00777 
 (1.542) (1.123) (0.0212) 
Constant 124.9*** 77.00*** 0.210*** 
 (0.632) (0.492) (0.00908) 
    
Observations 372 372 347 
R-squared 0.780 0.733 0.727 
All specifications include subject fixed effects. Each observation corresponds to a “pre” or a “post” 
stressor block of a single laboratory session. The total number of study participants was 97 with a total 
number of 186 sessions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 
Average Responses by Session 
 
Question 
Fraction Accepting 
Delay  
Fraction taking risky 
option B  
Average number of 
samples drawn 
 Day 1 Day 3  Day 1 Day 3  Day 1 Day 3 
Pre stressor 1 0.76 0.86  0.20 0.11  5.54 5.23 
Pre stressor 2 0.08 0.07  0.58 0.46  5.27 4.49 
Pre stressor 3 0.16 0.17  0.92 0.92  6.07 4.73 
Pre stressor 4 0.13 0.22  0.42 0.26  6.40 6.35 
Pre stressor 5 0.27 0.34  0.89 0.83  6.85 6.34 
Pre stressor 6 0.52 0.53  0.85 0.84  6.04 5.79 
Pre stressor 7 0.46 0.49  0.83 0.78    
Pre stressor 8 0.59 0.64  0.25 0.13    
Pre stressor 9 0.81 0.86  0.29 0.23    
Pre stressor 10 0.87 0.92  0.47 0.37    
Pre stressor 11 0.86 0.92       
                  
Post stressor 1 0.05 0.03  0.29 0.24  7.36 6.51 
Post stressor 2 0.06 0.07  0.81 0.77  6.55 6.79 
Post stressor 3 0.16 0.23  0.56 0.49  5.89 5.77 
Post stressor 4 0.20 0.24  0.37 0.23  5.29 5.65 
Post stressor 5 0.36 0.41  0.82 0.83  5.17 4.88 
Post stressor 6 0.54 0.52  0.14 0.12  5.29 4.99 
Post stressor 7 0.41 0.53  0.91 0.86    
Post stressor 8 0.68 0.71  0.48 0.40    
Post stressor 9 0.76 0.79  0.88 0.90    
Post stressor 10 0.89 0.95  0.17 0.13    
 
29 
 
 
 
Table 9: 
Main results 
VARIABLES 
Discounting  
ratea) 
Rate of risk  
aversionb) 
Experience  
samplingc) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Cold 0.272* 0.120 -0.206** 
 
(0.151) (0.297) (0.103) 
Cognitive 0.346** 0.325 -0.187* 
 
(0.149) (0.303) (0.105) 
Post -0.243* -0.229 0.141 
 
(0.134) (0.268) (0.101) 
Constant 0.908*** 0.344*** 1.741*** 
 
(0.0456) (0.0674) (0.0254) 
    Observations 372 372 372 
R-squared 0.758 0.576 0.870 
Notes: a) Dependent variable is the discounting rate computed based on the time discounting choices shown in 
Table 3. b) Dependent variable is the rate of risk aversion computed based on the risky lottery options in Table 
4. c) Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average number of random draws taken by the subject for 
the experience learning tasks outlined in Table 6. All specifications include subject fixed effects. Each observation 
corresponds to a “pre” or a “post” stressor block of a single laboratory session. The total number of study 
participants was 97 with a total number of 186 sessions.   Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
subject  level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Individual Differences in Economic Preferences  
 
Discounting  
ratea) 
Rate of risk  
aversionb) 
Experience  
samplingc) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Systolic blood pressure -0.00683 0.000663 -0.00607 
 
(0.00593) (0.00767) (0.00393) 
Diastolic blood pressure 0.0230*** -0.00360 0.00169 
 
(0.00795) (0.0110) (0.00669) 
Cortisol 0.279** -0.0890 0.319*** 
 
(0.118) (0.121) (0.0794) 
Age -0.159 0.205 0.0451 
 
(0.165) (0.214) (0.189) 
Age squared 0.00127 -0.00165 -0.000253 
 
(0.00128) (0.00167) (0.00152) 
Female -0.283 -0.229 0.0156 
 
(0.178) (0.234) (0.167) 
High school or less 2.157*** -0.541 -0.894*** 
 
(0.620) (0.545) (0.303) 
College 0.292 0.0376 -0.408** 
 
(0.179) (0.211) (0.189) 
Single 0.0349 0.0542 -0.0293 
 
(0.306) (0.391) (0.322) 
Married 0.508* 0.296 -0.0516 
 
(0.280) (0.357) (0.395) 
Separated 0.847*** 0.343 -0.363 
 
(0.299) (0.338) (0.319) 
Own house -0.0568 0.0638 0.00795 
 
(0.0574) (0.0776) (0.0821) 
Children 0.0259 -0.0253 0.0551 
 
(0.0616) (0.0783) (0.0588) 
Working 0.256 0.197 0.299 
 
(0.278) (0.351) (0.224) 
Unemployed 0.378 0.0900 0.305 
 
(0.268) (0.375) (0.228) 
Income group 2 0.259 -0.317 0.0550 
 
(0.251) (0.266) (0.175) 
Income group 3 -0.109 0.0238 0.372* 
 
(0.296) (0.277) (0.204) 
Income group 4 -0.120 -0.194 -0.0893 
 
(0.236) (0.312) (0.290) 
Income group 5 -0.0166 -0.526 0.0278 
 
(0.276) (0.387) (0.384) 
Income group 6 -0.177 -0.572* 0.519* 
 
(0.321) (0.302) (0.277) 
Constant 4.095 -5.854 0.575 
 
(5.264) (6.904) (5.910) 
Observations 339 339 339 
R-squared 0.336 0.065 0.227 
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Notes: a) Dependent variable is the discounting rate computed based on the time discounting choices shown in 
Table 3. b) Dependent variable is the rate of risk aversion computed based on the risky lottery options in Table 
4. c) Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average number of random draws taken by the subject for 
the experience learning tasks outlined in Table 6. All specifications include subject fixed effects. Each observation 
corresponds to a “pre” or a “post” stressor block of a single laboratory session. The total number of study 
participants was 97 with a total number of 186 sessions.   Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
subject  level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1: Picture of Cold Pressor Task Equipment 
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